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
To: W. W. Rem


From: . M. S. house

Subject: Fossible Removal of Missiles by Khrushchev

- i. At a moment when we are concerned with the difficulty of taking out the Soviet offensive capability deployed in Cube, we may tend to overlook the possibility that Khrushchev may remove it himself. This memorandum is intended to flag some of the questions which could arise in this connection.
- 2. Whether Khrushchev counted on our not finding out in time or on not reaching vigorously to our discovery, he may feel that he took a risk common-surete with the magnitude of the stake, and that he must now cut his losses much as Molotov and associates when they had barely falled to overthrow?

 Khrushchev in 1957 and then voted for their own condemnation.
- least in part into advantage. Suppose, for example, that he should manage to cover up his traces in Cuba in the near future sufficiently to predict correctly that a UN inspection team invited by Castro will find itself unable to determine whether there had once been IRBM's on certain sites. Further, suppose he were to exploit a negative UN finding by essenting that only the self-control and self-abnegation of the Soviets had folled the greatest wer proved that all time. (Khrushchev's message to Bertrand Russell is pertinent to the self-abnegation of the Soviet action which made it so incredible to many emong us will make its denial all the more credible to the world at large.
- 4. To the extent that this line of approach by Khrushchev may be a plausible part of an attempt to extricate nisself from a cangarous situation,





we should perhaps be thinking now of taking our some insurance against the charges to which we would be vulnerable - even though our policy objective of attaining removal of the missiles had been achieved.

THE LOCATION

- 5. One suggestion is that the durability and persuasiveness of our evidence (for the kind of audience we would have to convince) be closely examined in the context suggested here.
- 6. A second suggestion partly contingent on the first would be toconsider the feasibility and desirability of a raid of some kind in the near
 future which would enable us to produce (hard' evidence in support of our
 allegations.

